Note: I edited the question and answer
section for clarity. See the original article for higher
fidelity.
Under the leadership of Shinzo Abe,
it can feel as if Japan is enjoying a revolution of sorts.
Sweeping economic reforms are finally shaking up its
long-stagnant economy, while more foreign workers are
entering the country than ever before.
Soaring tourist numbers and major sporting events, like
this year's Rugby World Cup and the 2020 Summer Olympics, are
also keeping "Cool Japan," well, cool.
Georgetown University
Press
And all the while, Japan remains the
world's third-largest economy and one of its wealthiest
countries; most people there want for nothing, and some of
the major societal schisms fracturing Western societies
seem to be absent in Japan.
But none of these advantages will
help the country tackle its serious economic and demographic
problems. That's according to Brad Glosserman, a 27-year
resident of Japan and author of a new book, Peak
Japan: The End of Great Ambitions(Georgetown
University Press, 2019). Glosserman, now deputy director of
the Center for Rule-Making Strategies at Tama University in
Tokyo, decided to write the book after the earthquake and
tsunami in northeastern Japan in 2011. He wondered whether
those calamities would be enough to shake Japan out of its
comfortable, familiar stupor. His conclusion? Not so
much.
Glosserman spoke with Quartz ahead
of his book's publication next month. This interview has been
lightly edited for clarity and length.
Q: Your book says that we're
now at Peak Japan, which is peculiar as many people may
associate that with the years of its economic boom in the
1980s. Could you explain that?
A: In some ways you could say the
peak years were in the 90s, but for a more complete picture,
the Japanese are a more well-rounded, globally present
country now. They've recovered in some ways and risen again,
having
restored political stability after a period of time when
they didn't have that. The economy, too, in some respects has
recovered. You have to credit Abe in changing the trajectory
of the country and giving it new impetus, and assuming a new
leadership role on the international stage, including
resurrecting the CPTPP (Comprehensive and Progressive
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership). He didn't solve
Japan's problems, but he's put the floor on some of these
issues that other people couldn't have done.
Q: Why isn't Abe's
leadership enough to solve Japan's problems?
A: "We like what we have, we're a
small 'c' conservative country."
The nature of the challenges facing
Japan, and the need to reverse those trends that everybody
acknowledges are bad, requires structural shifts. And the
Japanese are not prepared to do that. "We like what we have,
we're a small 'c' conservative country, we are not prepared
to adopt a system that somebody else thinks we need when
we're not sure of it ourselves," they say. Japan is not like
a society trapped in the amber-of course it's changing and
evolving, but these are evolutionary, not revolutionary
changes. What the Japanese are is very Japanese. This is a
country that believes in law, resilience, stoicism, sucking
it up and getting through it. That, as one politician put it
to me, is an absolute brake on change in this
country.
The fact is that Abe isn't
representative of Japan. I do not see the forces for
sustained change in Japan.
Anecdotally in general in my circle,
this is true. Few have strong opinions one way or another about
Abe, but none think he is representative.
Q: What about Abe's stated
commitment to issues such as female labor participation?
That's enjoyed
some success in lifting the number of working women in
Japan.
A: For those on the right who seek
reforms to realize their dream of a more powerful and
influential Japan, they must balance their impact on social
norms and idealized social structures. With women, the
tension here is between what the government knows it has to
do to unleash their economic potential in society, but
there's also the notion of a woman's place in the household-I
think Abe really does believe in that. There's been all sorts
of policy nudges that the government could have done, but
they haven't, like making childcare widely available. That
tension has resulted in begrudging changes that are too
late.
"They don't like working women… I
don't like my choices. I haven't gotten married because I
feel that I would have to give up my career."
Japanese women in response don't
have fervent protests like the suffragettes, but they do
choose to act within their rights, like choosing not to get
married or have children, and taking jobs that allows them to
afford the lifestyle that they choose. One woman, an
associate professor at a university, told me: "The
LDP (Abe's Liberal Democratic Party) really likes the
traditional family system. They don't like working women… I
don't like my choices. I haven't gotten married because I
feel that I would have to give up my career." Now not only is
Japan's population shrinking, but preferences may have
permanently shifted, making it impossible for fertility rates
to reach or surpass replacement no matter what incentives are
offered.
My view on this is biased by working
for an American company where there are a lot of women
throughout all levels of the organization - and of course by
having a penis. However, looking at the crowds of "freshman"
employees flocking around Tokyo I don't see a government
discouraging working women. The bigger issues are around child
care, housing, and marriage in general.
Q: So where does that leave
Japan in terms of tackling its demographic crisis?
A: To me, it's extraordinarily
revealing that the Japanese government has made a conscious
decision to give up
one-fifth of its population, and say, "We're going to
hold the line at 100 million people."
[I]t's extraordinarily revealing
that the Japanese government has made a conscious decision to
give up one-fifth of its population.
Even in terms of
immigration, you have to look at what types of jobs the
government is looking to fill. What they really want is
people like me-advanced, educated folks who will
contribute high value-add to society. Then there's the second
group of people-younger, low-skilled workers doing jobs that
most of Japanese don't want to do. But they don't want these
people to come and stay. They want them to contribute and
then go home. The discussion over allowing
"integrated resorts" (casino) (paywall) is similar. It's
classic Japanese, and based on the Singapore model. They want
foreigners to come in to this small area and spend all their
money, but charge locals a lot of money to get in. That way,
you don't worry about contamination and having to integrate
them into the larger society.
This is a succinct summary of what
I've been saying.
Q: What about at the
corporate level?
A: This isn't a country that
forgives mistakes terribly well. So what does that encourage
you to do? Put your head down. That discourages
entrepreneurialism. So does the shrinking population. Steady
jobs at many companies are basically readily available for
you, so you just don't screw up and keep your head down and
go along with it. There isn't the same hunger and chip on
your shoulder that people have in
South Korea to prove themselves, and you don't have the
fearsome competitiveness of China.
Yes!
Don't get me wrong, the Japanese are
incredibly smart and can be very innovative, but they're very
good at process innovation. When they can see something in
front of them and they've got a goal to work towards. But
they historically have had a problem with coming up with the
idea of what to do next themselves. Now, they're looking back to "Cool
Japan" and traditional Japanese values and marketing that
aesthetic, for example.
Q: As Japan approaches a new
era with the
abdication of emperor Akihito, how do you think people
will look back on his reign?
A: People will look back at the
emperor and think that he was an extraordinary man in so many
ways. He was a voice of reason, a voice of calm and serenity.
He encapsulated the very best of Japan. There's even
speculation that he actually decided to abdicate as one way
of stopping the prime minister from getting his
constitutional revision to Article 9.
I hope the Emperor instilled many of
his core values in the Crown Prince. If so, the future is
bright. They make for a stark contrast with the ruling family
in the US.
Q: Going back to the
starting point for your book-the tsunami and Fukushima
nuclear disaster of 2011-where do things stand with that area
today?
A: [I]n Japan, people are supposed
to suffer in silence.
It's lagging. Nobody is happy with
what's going on, and there were extraordinary tensions in how
Japan was dealing with Fukushima. In some ways, people say
that the disaster broke Japan apart. The idea that all
Japanese were connected to each other-a powerful trope in
modern Japan-was revealed as fiction. Young people felt
little connection to the people in Tohoku (northeast), even
as politicians kept talking about the idea of kizuna
(bonds). Meanwhile, people in Tohoku feel as if they've been
forgotten. Many are still living in temporary homes, there
are still no-go zones, and the reactors are still
radioactive. They'll never go back to their old lives. But in
Japan, people are supposed to suffer in silence.
The flip side of this is that they are
not anchored in disaster, what I call misery porn. Misery porn
describes people not directly impacted by a tragic event yet
make it the cornerstone of their life.
Q: Why is it important for
people to pay attention to Japan's
decline?
A: Anyone with an interest in Asian
regional dynamics should be concerned about a gap between
expectations of Japan and what the country can and will
deliver. Unfulfilled expectations could lead to a rupture in
a crisis. My concern is that we, meaning Americans who have a
deep commitment to an important partnership, don't have our
expectations out of line.
